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Miller: Inclusions or Exclusions of Items of Gross Income as Circumstance

INCLUSIONS OR EXCLUSIONS OF ITEMS OF GROSS INCOME
AS CIRCUMSTANCES OF ADJUSTMENT UNDER
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 1312
INTRODUCrION

The mitigation provisions of the Internal Revenue Code represent a congressional attempt to ameliorate the inequities that can result from a strict
adherence to applicable statutes of limitations." For example, a taxpayer might
incorrectly include an item of income in one year. When that year is subsequently closed for correction by the statute of limitations, the taxpayer may
be required to include the same item in his gross income a second time. The
result is double taxation of the same item of income. Conversely, the running
of the statute of limitations could benefit the taxpayer by enabling him to
deduct the same expense in two different years.
Congress enacted the mitigation provisions in 19382 to prevent such inequities, yet preserve the integrity of the statute of limitations.3 To correct an
error and obtain relief under the mitigation provisions, the government or the
taxpayer must satisfy the following requirements enumerated in section 1311:
(1) there is a "determination" as defined in section 1313; (2) the determination fits within one of the circumstances of adjustment described in section
1312; (3) the statute of limitations or other rules of law prevent correcting
the error through normal procedures; and (4) an inconsistent position has
been asserted as described by section 1311(b)(1).4
This paper shall analyze the second requirement, the circumstances of adjustment set forth in section 1312. The focus will be on two of these circum1. The mitigation provisions are found in I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1982).
2. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 820, 52 Stat. 581. This legislation became § 8801 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 471 and, with some amendment, is now embodied in
I.R.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1982). As originally enacted, § 3801(b)(3) corresponded to § 1312(3)(A).
There was no corresponding version of § 1312(3)(B) in the early statute. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 redesignated § 3801(b)(3) as § 1312(3)(A) and added § 1312(3)(B). The two
subsections both apply to a double exclusion from gross income, but they are mutually exclusive in application, depending upon whether the taxpayer has included the "item" excluded from gross income in a return or has paid tax with respect to it. If § 1312(3)(A) applies,
the inconsistent position requirement of § 1311(b)(1) is triggered. If § 1312(3)(B) applies, the
inconsistent position requirement is replaced by the "correction not barred at time of
erroneous action" requirement of § 1311(b)(2).
3. The Senate Finance Committee Report states that the statute should "preserve unimpaired the essential function of the statute of limitations." S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong.,
3d Sess. 49 (1938).
4. I.R.C. § 1311(a) (1982). See Karpe v. United States, 335 F.2d 454, 458-59 (Ct. C1. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965) (the fourth requirement must be qualified because in
circumstances described by § 1312(3)(B) or § 1312(4), the inconsistent position requirement of
§ 131T(b)(1) is replaced by the requirement of § 1311(b)(2) that correction of the error not
be barred at a certain time). See also Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. United States, 265 F.2d
293, 296 (7th Cir. 1959) (holding that the mitigation provisions provide for adjustments to
correct errors only under the particular circumstances set forth in § 1312).
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stances, section 1312(1) regarding the double inclusion of an item of gross
income and section 1312(3) regarding the double exclusion of an item of gross
income. 5 The application of both sections is dependent on the interpretation
of the term "item" which is undefined in the Code. Judicial decisions construing the sections are often inconsistent," particularly regarding the definition of the term "item." An attempt shall be made to identify the underlying
policy considerations in the courts' rationale. These decisions will then be
placed within a conceptual framework that is both useful as an analytical tool
as well as consistent with the purposes of the mitigation provisions.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MITIGATION PROVISIONS

In 1938, the House Subcommittee on Internal Revenue Taxation stated:
"The sole purpose of the statute of limitations is to prevent the litigation of
stale claims. Its use to obtain a twofold advantage, whether by double deduction or double taxation, is not in keeping with its fundamental purpose."7 The
Subcommittee recommended drafting provisions which adjusted the statute of
limitations to insure the taxation of income and allowance of deductions in
the proper taxable year." Congress responded by enacting the first mitigation
provision, section 3801.9
Legislative reports indicate that Congress had more than one purpose in
mind when it enacted section 3801.10 Congress sought to prevent double taxa-

5. I.R.C. § 1312 (1982) states in relevant part:
The circumstances under which the adjustment provided in section 1311 is authorized are as follows:
(1) The determination requires the inclusion in gross income of an item which was
erroneously included in the gross income of the taxpayer for another year or in the
gross income of a related taxpayer.
(3) (A) The determination requires the exclusion from gross income of an item
included in a return filed by the taxpayer or with respect to which tax was paid and
which was erroneously excluded or omitted from the gross income of the taxpayer for
another taxable year, or from the gross income of related taxpayer; or
(B) The determination requires the exclusion from gross income of an item not
included in a return filed by the taxpayer and with respect to which the tax was not
paid but which is includible in the gross income of the taxpayer for another taxable
year or in the gross income of a related taxpayer.
6. See Note, Sections 1311-1315 of the Internal Revenue Code: Some Problems in Administration, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1536, 1543 (1959) (it is difficult if not impossible to reconcile
the results reached in these cases).
7. See Report of the Subcommittee on Ways and Means on a Proposed Revision of the
Revenue Laws, H.R. REP. No. 79, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 54 (1938).
8. Id. at 79.
9. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 820, 52 Stat. 581. Minor amendments were made to
§ 3801 in 1954 and 1958. For a discussion of these changes see Knickerbocker, Mysteries of
Mitigation: The Opening of Barred Years in Income Tax Cases, 30 FORm-HAM L. REy. 225,
225-26 n.5 (1961).
10. The Senate Finance Committee Report which accompanied the 1938 legislation
articulates the purposes and objectives sought by Congress when it enacted § 3801. After de-
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tion and double deductions by providing a mechanism which attributed income or deductions to the right year and the right taxpayer.11 Congress, however, did not intend the mitigation provisions to correct all errors and render
the statute of limitations meaningless.12 This latter purpose invariably conscribing three examples of errors which could not be corrected because of the statute of
limitations, the Committee Report states:
In each case, under existing law, an unfair benefit would have been obtained by
assuming an inconsistent position and then taking shelter behind the protective barrier
of the statute of limitations. Such resort to the statute of limitations is a plain misuse
of its fundamental purpose. The purpose of the statute of limitations to prevent the
litigation of stale claims is fully recognized and approved. But it was never intended
to sanction active exploitation, by the beneficiary of the statutory bar, of opportunities
only open to him if he assumes a position diametrically opposed to that taken prior
to the running of the statute. The Federal courts in many somewhat similar tax cases
have sought to prevent inequitable results by applying principles variously designated
as estoppel, quasi-estoppel, recoupment and set-off. For various reasons, mostly technical, these judicial efforts cannot extend to all problems of this type. Nor can they
provide a uniform, systematic solution of these problems. Legislation has long been
needed to supplement the equitable principles applied by the courts and to check the
growing volume of litigation by taking the profit out of inconsistency, whether exhibited by taxpayers or revenue officials and whether fortuitous or the result of design.
The legislation here proposed is based upon the following principles:
(1) To preserve unimpaired the essential function of the statute of limitations,
corrective adjustments should (a) never modify the application of the statute except
when the party or parties in whose favor it applies shall have justified such modification by active inconsistency, and (b) under no circumstances affect the tax save with
respect to the influence of the particular items involved in the adjustment.
(2) Subject to the foregoing principles, disputes as to the year in which income or
deductions belong, or as to the person who should have the tax burden of income or
the tax benefit of deductions, should never result in a double tax or a double reduction of tax, or an inequitable avoidance of tax.
(3) Disputes as to the basis of property should not allow the taxpayer or the Commissisoner to obtain an unfair tax advantage by taking one position at the time of the
acquisition of property and an inconsistent position at the time of its disposition.
(4) Corrective adjustments should produce the effect of attributing income or deductions to the right year and the right taxpayer, and of establishing the proper basis.
S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 49, 49-50 (1938).
The House of Representatives accepted the mitigation provisions drafted by the Senate
Finance Committee, with only minor changes. In the Statement of the House Managers
following the Conference on the Revenue Act of 1938, the House Managers stated:
This amendment provides for mitigation of some of the inequities under the
income-tax laws caused by the statute of limitations and other provisions which now
prevent equitable adjustment of various income-tax hardships....
Under the income-tax laws it is possible for a taxpayer or the Commissioner, after
operation of the statute of limitations or some other provision of the internal-revenue
laws prevents correction of an error, to obtain a double advantage by taking a position
contradictory to that which caused the error. The Senate amendment was drawn to
discourage this practice in specified types of cases by authorizing corrective adjustment.
H.R. REP. No. 2330, 75th Cong, 8d Sess. 54, 56 (1938).
11. See S. RE'. No. 1567, suproi note 10, at 49-50.
12. See supra note 3,
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flicts with the goal of attributing income and deductions to the proper taxpayer in the correct year. Another congressional objective in passing the
mitigation statute was to check the growing volume of litigation resulting from
attempts by taxpayers or the Commissioner to exploit the statute of limitations
either by avoiding tax or imposing a double tax.' 3
Any interpretation of the mitigation provisions must consider these congressional objectives. Courts, however, when interpreting this section, generally concentrate on the narrow issue of whether the mitigation statute is a
penal or remedial provision. If characterized as penal, designed to penalize
those who attempt to exploit the statute of limitations to gain an unfair tax
advantage, the statute is generally accorded a strict construction." 4 If characterized as remedial, designed to alleviate the hardship of double taxation,
the statute is construed liberally.15
This dualistic approach does injustice to the multiple objectives underlying the mitigation provisions.- 6 A preferable approach is one which synthesizes the opposing doctrines and considers them in relation to the legislative objectives and the particular facts and equities of each case. For example,
a strict construction of the statute is appropriate to preserve the essential function of the statute of limitations when a claim has become stale or difficult to
prove due to the passage of time." A liberal construction is appropriate to
prevent double taxation or double deduction when pertinent facts are available and the equities strongly favor corrective action.' 8
DOUBLE INCLUSION OF AN ITEM OF GROSS INCOME:

SECTION 1312(1)
Much of the litigation involving the interpretation of section 1312(1)

focuses on the meaning of the term "item." Although not specifically defined
13.

S. REP. No. 1567, supra note 10, at 49; H.R. REP. No. 79, supra note 7, at 55. The

courts had applied various equitable doctrines such as estoppel or recoupment to prevent
such abuses, but these judicial efforts failed to produce a uniform and consistent set of
results. See First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. United States, 565 F.2d 507, 512-14 (8th Cir. 1977).
In Omaha, the court observed that the Supreme Court's efforts to solve the mitigation problem by the application of recoupment or related equitable doctrines had merely increased
the vagueness in the revenue laws and had encouraged litigation. Id. Technical distinctions
abounded and litigation became uncertain and unpredictable. Id. at 514. The mitigation
statute, thus, was intended "to supplement the equitable principles . . . and to check the

growing volume of litigation ..

" S. REP. No. 1567, supra note 10, at 49.

14. See Knickerbocker, supra note 9, at 227 (stating unequivocally that the mitigation
statute is "a penalty, not . . . an act for anybody's relief," which is designed to penalize
those who stir things up again after the statute has run).
15. Of course, any time one party is penalized, the other party will benefit correspondingly. Thus, viewed from that other party's perspective, the statute is remedial and should
be construed liberally to achieve that purpose. See, e.g., Gooch Milling & Elevator Co. v.
United States, 78 F. Supp. 94, 100 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
16. See Note, supra note 6, at 1546-47, which observes that "the potentiality for error
latent in the conscious adoption of either general canon weighs in favor of subordinating
both to a more particularized and purposive... technique."

17. S. REP. No. 1567, supra note 10, at 49.
18. Id. at 49-50.
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in the Code, item is used in section 61 to encompass the various matters which
represent gross income. 9 It does not appear, however, that Congress intended
the section 61 meaning to apply to section 1312 and courts generally have rejected such an analogy when interpreting the section. 20 Instead, courts have
interpreted item in accordance with the perceived congressional policy under2
lying the mitigation statutes. '
In Gooch Milling & Elevator Co. v. United States,22 the taxpayer sought
relief under section 3801 in order to correct his overstatement of income for
the 1934-35 fiscal year which had been closed by the statute of limitations. The
overstatement resulted from the taxpayer's erroneous inclusion of wheat, to
which the taxpayer did not have title, in his opening and closing inventories.23
The Commissioner denied the taxpayer's claim for adjustment finding that
inventories are not items of income within the meaning of section 3801. The
Commissioner claimed that Congress intended the term item to refer to

19. I.R.C. § 61 (1982) states in relevant part:
[G]ross income... includ[es] the following items:
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, and similar items;
(2) Gross income derived from business;
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property;
(4) Interest;
(5) Rents;
(6) Royalties;
(7) Dividends;
(8) Alimony and separate maintenance payments;
(9) Annuities;
(10) Income from life insurance and endowment contracts;
(11) Pensions;
(12) Income from discharge of indebtedness;
(13) Distributive share of partnership gross income;
(14) Income in respect of a decedent; and
(15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust.
See also Maguire, Surrey & Traynor, Section 820 of Revenue Act of 1938, 48 YALE

LJ.
719,
751-52 (1939).
20. But see infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
21. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
22. 78 F. Supp. 94 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
23. Id. at 95. It is instructive to examine the role of inventories in the determination of
gross income in connection with the analysis of Gooch and other inventory cases. A taxpayer's
gross income includes his gross operating profits, which are derived by subtracting the cost
of goods sold from gross sales. The cost of goods sold, however, is directly affected by the
value of the opening and closing inventories reported by the taxpayer. Furthermore, the
valuation of one year's inventories is directly linked to the valuation of the succeeding or
preceeding year's inventory, because the closing inventory of one year always equals the
opening inventory of the succeeding year. Thus, to the extent that a taxpayer changes or is
required to change the value or method of assigning values to his inventory in one year, it
is only proper that corresponding changes should be made in the inventory values assigned
in previous years. These corresponding adjustments will then provide consistent tax treatment
and prevent double taxation or tax avoidance. As long as the changes in inventory values
can be traced back year-by-year, one can legitimately say that the same item of gross income
is being included or excluded twice unless such adjustments are made.
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specifically identifiable items such as dividends, salaries, gain or loss on the
2
sale of property, or bad debt. 4

The Court of Claims rejected the Commissioner's narrow construction of
item, and held that "any item or amount which affects gross income in more
than one year, and produces, as a result double taxation, double deduction or
inequitable avoidance of tax" should be included within the meaning of item
under section 3801.25 The court noted that while inventories are not of them-

selves items of income, any change in their cost or value will directly affect
gross income. Recognizing the remedial nature of section 3801, the court
adopted a liberal construction of the section and held that the wheat was an
item of income.26

In H.T. Hackney Co. v. United States, 27 a companion case to Gooch, the
taxpayer for five years erroneously overstated not a specific commodity but his
entire inventory. The Court of Claims did not distinguish the two cases and
reached the same result. The Hackney court held that item includes "the result flowing from an increase or decrease in operating profit or loss through
28
adjustments in two or more years in the cost or value of inventories."
In M. Fine & Sons Manufacturing Co. v. United States,- the Court of
Claims analogized the inventory overstatements of Gooch and Hackney to depreciation allowances and found that such allowances constituted items of
gross income within the meaning of section 3801. In an effort to increase employment opportunities for its residents, the city of Vicksburg, Mississippi
gave a factory to the taxpayer in 1944.30 The taxpayer recorded, in its books,
depreciation on the factory as part of its cost of goods sold for the years 1943
through 1946. Because the Internal Revenue Service denied deductions for
depreciation on municipal property transferred to a taxpayer, no depreciation

24. Id. at 99-100.
25. Id. at 100.
We think, upon further consideration, that the section should not be given such a
limited interpretation. The term "item" was not defined or limited by Congress and in
our opinion it should be interpreted to include any item or amount which affects
gross income in more than one year, and produces, as a result, double taxation,
double deduction or inequitable avoidance of tax.
7d.

26. Id.
27. 78 F. Supp. 101 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
28. Id. at 110. In United States v. Dubuque Packing Co., 233 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1956),
and Moultrie Cotton Mills v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 482 (Ct. Cl. 1957), the Gooch and
Hackney holdings were extended to include situations where a taxpayer's voluntary change
in inventory valuation resulted in an overstatement of income. As no valid purpose behind
the statute of limitations would have been served by barring correction of the errors, there
was no reason to construe item restrictively. See also United States v. Rachal, 312 F.2d 376
(5th Cir. 1962); Rev. Rul. 58-327, 1958-1 C.B. 316. Cf. D.A. MacDonald, 17 T.C. 934 (1951).
29. 168 F. Supp. 769 (Ct. CI. 1958).
30. Id. at 770. The taxpayer had been given two factories, one by the community of
Paducah, Kentucky in 1942 and another by the community of Vicksburg, Mississippi in 1944.
The Paducah factory is not relevant to the application of § 1312.
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was reflected in the taxpayer's income tax return. 31 In 1947, the factory was
32
sold and gain was computed using a zero basis.
Subsequent to the factory's sale, the Supreme Court held that the taxpayer
who receives municipal property as an inducement to locate in the community
acquires a carryover basis in the property and can take depreciation deductions
against that basis.3 3 Relying on this decision, and using the transferor's nondepreciated basis, the Fine taxpayer filed a claim for refund for 1947. The
claim was to recover the amount of gain reported on the sale of the factory
which should have been treated as recovery of basis. The Commissioner allowed the claim yet reduced the requested refund to reflect a decrease in the
taxpayer's basis for depreciation allowable on the factory during the years
1944 through 1946. The taxpayer, who had not claimed depreciation for the
factory for those years, then filed a claim for refund for the years 1943 through
1946 which were closed by the statute of limitations.
The Court of Claims found that the Commissioner, in recalculating the
gain from the factory's sale, erroneously adjusted the carryover basis to reflect
depreciation allowances never deducted by the taxpayer.3 4 This adjustment
resulted in an inclusion in the taxpayer's gross income for 1947 of an amount
which previously had been taxed in 1944 through 1946. The court recognized
that depreciation deductions, like inventories, are "constituent elements in the
determination of the cost of goods sold" and thus are items of income. The
Commissioner's erroneous disallowance of these constituent elements resulted
in the double inclusion of items of gross income.35
The government argued in Fine that the court's decision would nullify the
statute of limitations on allowable depreciation deductions not properly
claimed by a taxpayer.30 Of course, such a result happens only where the
property, which has not been depreciated to the full extent allowable is soldY7
31. Id. at 771. See, e.g., Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98 (1943).
32. 168 F. Supp. at 771. Apparently the taxpayer believed that property acquired by
gift assumed a zero basis.
33. Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 339 U.S. 583 (1950) (such carryover basis is proper
only when the transfer is used to induce the transferee to locate in the community).
34. 168 F. Supp. at 771, 774. The Commissioner held that the taxpayer's basis for determining gain on the sale of the Vicksburg factory was the transferee's basis reduced by
previously unallowed depreciation. The result was to include in taxpayer's 1947 gross income
an amount, which because of the previous disallowance of depreciation deductions, had already been included in taxpayer's gross income. Id. at 774.
35. Id. The Court stated:
Depredation allowances are as much constituent elements in the determination of the
cost of goods sold as the inventories with which the court was concerned in the Gooch
and Hackney cases, and the erroneous disallowance by the Commissioner of one of the
constituent elements (depreciation) in determining this plaintiff's cost of goods sold
resulted in an erroneous inclusion in gross income herein under the holdings in the
above cases.
Id.

36. Id. at 774-75.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Rushlight, 291 F.2d 508, 517-18 (9th Cir. 1961) where the
court pointed out the incongruous and inequitable result of allowing a taxpayer who sells
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The court, however, apparently restricted its holding to situations where depreciable property is involved in the production or manufacture of goods. The
depreciation deduction is an item of gross income only when it is used as a
constituent element in determining the cost of goods sold.3 8 Otherwise, the
depreciation allowance is a deductible expense which has no effect on the
taxpayer's gross income. s9
The government's concern in Fine did not materialize in Gardiner v.
United States,4 0 where the Tenth Circuit restricted section 1312's application
to "positive items" of income. 4 1 In Gardiner, the taxpayer failed to take a
deduction for allowable depreciation on rental property held for the production of income. Rather than employing Fine to disallow the claim, the court
strictly interpreted the term item and held "failure to take deductions for
allowable depreciation does not constitute an erroneous inclusion in the taxpayer's gross income in another tax year where the property is rental property
held for the production of income."42
Although Gardiner'sresult is reconcilable with that in Fine, its rationale
is not. The Fine court apparently adopted the broad "item affects gross income" approach of Gooch in order to prevent double taxation. 4 3 The Gardiner
a capital asset to correct errors in failing to take depreciation in closed years while preventing a taxpayer who retains the assets from correcting such errors. The Rushlight court,
despite this observation, followed the distinction relied upon in Fine and did not permit the
taxpayer who still retained ownership of the asset to correct his erroneous failure to take
depreciation on the asset. Id.
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-11(c)(2)(iii)(b) (1973).
59. Fine has been criticized because it was decided under one of the general provisions
on income, § 3801(b)(1), rather than under the basis provisions of the mitigation statute,
§ 3801(b)(5), the predecessor of § 1312(7). See Note, supra note 6, at 1545. In this regard the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Rushlight, 291 F.2d 508, 515 (9th Cir. 1961), held that
depreciation questions, like that presented in Fine, present "basically problems of inconsistent treatment of basis, and as such . . . should be considered under Section 3801(b)(5), a
circumstance of adjustment addressed specifically to problems of basis." But see Gooding v.
United States, 326 F.2d 988, 991 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
There is no reason, however, why § 3801(b)(1) and § 3801(b)(5), or their successors, § 1312(1)
and § 1312(7), should be construed as mutually exclusive. The mitigation statute was intended, in part, to provide relief from double taxation for taxpayers who had the same item
of income included in their gross income in two different years. There is no indication that
Congress cared whether the double taxation resulted from an inconsistent treatment of basis
or from some other cause. The fact that Congress included a specific provision relating to the
inconsistent treatment of basis does not, by itself, imply that Congress intended such provision to displace other provisions which might also be applicable. Rather, furtherance of
the remedial objectives of the mitigation statute requires that the basis provision should be
considered as a supplement to the other circumstances of adjustment described in § 1312.
When the other § 1312 circumstances do not apply, § 1312(7) is applicable. In the cases
where there is overlap between § 1312(1) and § 1312(7), however, both provisions, not just
§ 1312(7), should be considered. See, e.g., Gooding v. United States, 326 F.2d 988, 991 (Ct. Cl.
1964); Skinner v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 384 (M.D. Fla. 1963) (applying § 1312(1) in a
situation involving the inconsistent treatment of basis).
40. 536 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1976).
41. Id. at 906.
42. Id.

43. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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court apparently adopted the more restrictive interpretation of item found in
section 61 which is limited to specific items and does not include all elements
which cause an increase in taxes. 44 This conclusion, however, is not based on
any dear pronouncement of rationale by the courts. Thus, the opinions provide little guidance for taxpayers who wish adjustment under section 1312 or
45
courts which attempt to delineate the section's parameters in the future.
The following year, the Eighth Circuit rejected the restrictive approach of
Gardiner in favor of a liberalized version of the Gooch interpretation. In
First National Bank of Omaha v. United States,46 Margaret Doorly owned
23,973 shares of stock in World Publishing Company and was the remainder
beneficiary of the Hitchcock Trust, which owned 32,400 shares in the same
corporation. In January of 1963, pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation,
the company made a liquidating distribution of $166 per share to its shareholders. The corporation retained a reserve fund amounting to $19 per share
47
to meet potential liabilities.
In February of 1963, the life beneficiary of the Hitchcock Trust died and
the trust corpus, including the 32,400 shares, was distributed to Margaret
44. The court held:
The meaning of an item of gross income is, under Section 61 of the 1954 Code, limited to specific items and does not include everything that results in an increase in
tax. It is restricted to positive items and does not include negative elements such as
deductions (like depreciation), the omission of which results in increased taxes.
536 F.2d at 906. See also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
45. In Rigdon v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 150 (S.D. Cal. 1961), supplemental proceeding, 209 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. Cal. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 323 F.2d 446 (9th Cir.
1963), the Commissioner challenged deductions arising out of a gift-leaseback arrangement
between related taxpayers. The taxpayer had gifted farm property to his daughter and had
then leased it back from her. He deducted his rental payments in 1944 and his daughter
included the payments as income for that year. The Commissioner disallowed the taxpayer's
rental deduction and the daughter filed a refund claim to recover the taxes paid by her on
income derived from the xental payments in 1944. By that time, the statute of limitations
barred any claim for refund for 1944. The daughter asserted, however, that 1944 could be
reopened under § 1312(1). Id. at 151.
Clearly there had been an inclusion of the rental payments in the daughter's gross income for 1944. The issue was whether there had also been a corresponding inclusion of this
item in the taxpayer's gross income for 1944 by reason of the disallowance of the rental
expense deduction taken by the taxpayer. The court, relying on Gooch, held that the disallowance of the deduction produced an inclusion in gross income and therefore § 1312(l)
was applicable. Id. at 153-54.
Rigdon cannot be reconciled with either the holding or the language of Gardiner. One
need not adopt the narrow interpretation of "item" set forth in Gardiner, however, to conclude that Rigdon is wrongly decided. The disallowance of the rental expense deduction in
Rigdon, unlike the failure to take depredation allowance deductions in Fine, did not affect
the taxpayer's gross income. It affected the taxpayer's taxable income, but § 1312(l) refers
to gross, not taxable, income. Thus, even under the Gooch "item affects gross income" definition, Rigdon's result cannot be justified.
46. 565 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1977).
47. Id. at 510. World was sued for a commission allegedly due a broker. To meet this
potential liability, the Board of Directors resolved to retain a fund of four million dollars,
amounting to $19 per share, until all claims were settled. Id.
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Doorly. She immediately gifted the property to an irrevocable family trust. On
her gift tax return she listed the value of the transferred shares as $17 per
share. On her 1963 income tax return, Mrs. Doorly recognized the receipt of
$185 per share for both the 23,973 shares held in her own name and 32,400
shares received from the Hitchcock trust. The S185 amount represented the
$166 per share actually received plus $19 per share constructively received from
the reserve fund. She reported a capital gain from the liquidation and paid a
tax of $2,332,257.19, of which $267,771.75 represented the tax on the $19 per
share constructively received.
In 1964, Margaret Doorly died, and the right to the final liquidating
dividend on her 23,973 shares was included in her estate at a date of death
value of $17 per share. In 1965, the company distributed its final liquidation
at $18.55 per share. 48 The estate and family trust each claimed a loss of 45
cents per share, based on Mrs. Doorly's 1963 return which reported constructive receipt of $19 per share. The Commissioner challenged the claims of loss,
contending applicable state law dictated that income should not be reported
until received. The Commissioner concluded that Mrs. Doorly erred in reporting the constructive receipt of $19 per share in 1963 and therefore was not
entitled to a loss deduction.49
In addition, the Commissioner determined that because the estate had a
section 1014 basis of $17.00 per share it must recognize a gain of S1.55 per
share. The trust, on the other hand, had a section 1015 basis in its shares, and
should recognize no gain or loss. 50 Because 1963 was closed by the statute of
limitations, the estate and the trust representatives sought refunds under the
mitigation statute for the overpayment of $267,771 resulting from the erroneous inclusion of the $19 per share. 51 They contended that the Commissioner's disallowance of losses and the estate's recognition of income constituted a double inclusion of an item of income appropriate for adjustment.
The district court held that both the estate and the family trust were entitled to an adjustment for the year 1963.52 Clearly the mitigation statutes applied to the estate because it had been taxed on reserve fund distributions in
1965 which had been previously taxed as constructively received in 1963.53
The trust had been taxed on such distributions in 1963 and was subsequently
denied a loss deduction in 1965. The Commissioner contended that there was
no double inclusion of an item of gross income with respect to the trust because there merely had been a disallowance of loss and not an inclusion in
48. Id. at 511. The distribution was paid after all potential liabilities were resolved.
49. Id. at 510.
50. Id. at 511. Under § 1015 the transferee's basis of gift property is the same as the
transferor's basis, i.e., $19 recognized constructively. The basis in case of loss is limited to the
property's fair market value at the date of the gift, i.e., $17.
51. Id. The $267,771 represents the tax paid in 1963 on the $19 constructively received
from World's reserve fund.
52. First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. United States, 76-2 U.S.T.C. 9767, 39 A.F.T.R.2d 777582 (D. Neb. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 565 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1977).
53. With respect to the estate, the more difficult issue was whether Margaret Doorly and
the estate were related taxpayers, as defined in § 1313(c). The court rejected a narrow, literal
reading of the statute and ruled in the affirmative. 565 F.2d at 515-16.
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gross income. The district court, relying on Gooch's broad definition of item
of income, ruled that section 1312(1) also applied to the trust because the
"unexpended pro rata share of the reserve is an item of income which remains
the same item in both years despite the disparity of treatment." 54 On appeal,
the Eighth Circuit considered this issue academic because the "inclusion of an
'item of income' for the estate triggers an analysis and adjustment of the whole
transaction."55
The Court of Appeals' opinion in Omaha reflects a misunderstanding of
the mitigation provisions. The issue of whether there was a double inclusion
of an item of gross income for the trust is not academic and should not have
been avoided by the court. Rather than analyzing the transaction as a whole,
the court should have segregated the transaction into its component parts. If
there was no double inclusion of an item of gross income regarding the trust's
32,400 shares, then no refund was due for the tax paid in 1963. The fact that
section 1312(1) applies to the estate and its 23,973 shares is irrelevant to the
treatment of the trust's 32,400 shares.
The mitigation statute only applies to correct errors described in one of
the circumstances of adjustment listed in section 1312. The statute limits adjustment solely to correcting erroneous treatment of an item described in the
applicable section 1312 circumstance.5 6 The inconsistent treatment of the
estate's gain on its 23,973 shares in 1965 triggered the application of section
1312(1) to correct the erroneous inclusion of 19 per share in 1963. This correction, however, was limited solely to the estate's shares. The fact that the
same erroneous inclusion of $19 per share was made regarding the trust's
32,400 shares does not justify an adjustment under the mitigation provisions
unless section 1312(1) also applies to the trust's shares.
The district court decided that section 1312(1) did apply to the trust's
shares. That finding is clearly incorrect. The disallowance of a deduction, like
a failure to take a deduction, does not increase or affect gross income unless
the deduction is a constituent element in the determination of the cost of
goods sold.57 If not a constituent element, then such deduction only affects a
taxpayer's taxable income, rather than gross income, and thus renders section
1312(1) inapplicable."5 In Omaha, the disallowance of the loss deduction
54. Id. at 515.
55. Id.
56. See I.R.C. § 1814(a) (1982).
57. See, e.g., Gardiner v. United States, 536 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1976); M. Fine & Sons
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 168 F. Supp. 769 (Ct. C1.1958).
58. An analysis of the statutory matrix of § 1312, however, reveals that Congress differentiated between the concepts of gross income and taxable income in § 1512. Correction of
errors involving gross income is provided for in I.R.C. § 1812(1) (1982) (double inclusion in
gross income) and in I.R.C. § 1312(3) (1982) (double exclusion from gross income). To
complement § 1312(1) and § 1312(5) in cases involving errors reflected in taxable income but
not in gross income, Congress provided for the correction of such errors under § 1312(2)
(double allowance of a deduction) and § 1312(4) (double disallowance of a deduction). I.R.C.
§§ 1312(2) & 1312(4) (1982) provide for adjustments when the circumstances are as follows:
(2) The determination allows a deduction or credit which was erroneously allowed
to the taxpayer for another taxable year or to a related taxpayer.
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merely affected the trust's taxable income. Therefore, even under the broad
Gooch definition of "item affects gross income," section 1312(l) does not apply
to the trust's 32,400 shares. 59
The liberal application of section 1312(1) in Omaha, where components of
a transaction are merged and taxable income is equated with gross income,
can neither be reconciled with Gardiner's0 restrictive interpretation nor with
the broad construction found in Gooch-s or Fine.62 Although the results in
Fine and Gardiner are reconcilable, 63 the divergent rationales employed in
reaching such results afford little insight regarding which legislative policies
are being furthered. This inarticulation of policy prevents judicial consistency
in the application of section 1312(1) and prompts confusion where clear
standards are needed.
DOUBLE EXCLUSION OF ITEM OF GROSS INCOME:

SEcTION 1312(3)
The interpretation of section 1312(3), like that of 1312(1), is dependent
upon the meaning ascribed Lo the term "item." Accordingly, when interpreting
(4) The determination disallows a deduction or credit which should have been allowed to, but was not allowed to, the taxpayer for another taxable year, or to a related
taxpayer.
Thus, there is no statutory support for blurring the concepts of gross income and taxable
income as the district court did in Omaha. The disallowance of the trust's loss deduction is
not described by § 1312(l). Furthermore, because there was no double disallowance of a
deduction for the trust, § 1312(4) does not authorize correction of the trusts erroneous overreporting of income.
59. The trust, however, could apply I.R.C. § 1312(7) (1982) ("basis of property after
erroneous treatment of prior transaction" provision) to correct its error. The major roadblock
to § 1312(7) application is the requirement that "the determination determines the basis of
property." The Tax Court and the Second Circuit have construed this requirement strictly
and have held that it is not satisfied merely because the determination determines facts upon
which the basis directly depends. See, e.g., Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. United
States, 163 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1947); Brennen v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 495 (1953); American
Found. Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 502 (1943). The Court of Claims has taken a more liberal
view, however, and has held that § 1312(7) can apply if the determination has a direct, immediate and massive impact on the basis of property, even if it does not expressly determine
such basis. Gooding v. United States, 326 F.2d 988 (Ct. Cl. 1964). See also Great Falls Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 388 F. Supp. 577 (D. Mont. 1975) (holding that § 1312(7) applies
where the determination indirectly affected the basis in property but did not specifically and
expressly determine it). Under the Gooding and Great Falls National Bank interpretations,
§ 1312(7) could be applicable to the trust's situation because the determination indirectly
determined the basis of the stock shares, insofar as the Commissioner based his disallowance
on the trust's refund claim for fiscal year 1964 upon his determination of the trust's basis in
the stock shares under § 1015. Although a thorough analysis of the intricate and detailed
provisions of § 1312(7) is beyond the scope of this paper, a careful analysis of that provision
will show that the remaining requirements of § 1312(7) are satisfied with respect to Margaret
Doorly's acquisition of the 32,400 shares of stock in 1963 and the correction of her erroneous
reporting of gross income of $19 per share for 1963.
60. 536 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1976). See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
61. 78 F. Supp. 94 (Ct. Cl. 1948). See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
62. 168 F. Supp. 769 (Ct. Cl. 1958). See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
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item within section 1312(3), courts often look to the judicial construction of
section 1312(1).
In Karpe v. United States,64 the Court of Claims liberally applied section
1312(3)(A) in the reallocation of community property between two divorced
taxpayers. The taxpayer had omitted $225,000 from his 1944 return. In 1949
the Commissioner discovered this omission and assessed a deficiency against
both the taxpayer and his ex-wife. The deficiency was calculated by a formula
which allocated approximately sixty-nine percent of the $225,000 to the taxpayer as his separate income and the remaining thirty-one percent as community income, to be divided equally between the two parties. 65 The taxpayer
paid his share of the assessed deficiency and sought a refund, claiming that the
allocation formula was erroneous. 68 The district court agreed and reallocated
the $225,000 in a manner that produced an overpayment of $97,000 for the
taxpayer and a deficiency of $55,000 for his ex-wife. The Commissioner offset
the ex-wife's $55,000 deficiency against the taxpayer's refund claim, resulting
in a refund of only $42,000. The taxpayer filed suit in district court contending that the assessment and collection of the deficiency against his ex-wife was
7
barred by the statute of limitations.6
The taxpayer argued that section 1312(3)(A) was inapplicable in this
situation because no specific "item of income" was excluded from his 1944
income tax return by the district court's reallocations; the district court
merely changed the division between separate and community income. Citing
Gooch and its view of congressional intent, the Court of Claims rejected the
taxpayer's restrictive interpretation of the term item.68 The court held that
the amount which was excluded from the taxpayer's 1944 gross income and
subsequently included in the gross income of his ex-wife constituted an item
of gross income within the meaning of section 1312.
The Karpe holding is consistent with the purposes of the mitigation statute
as well as with numerous cases which rejected the "specificity of item requirement" urged by the taxpayer.69 Furthermore, there were no evidentiary prob63. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
64. 335 F.2d 454 (Ct. Cl. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965).
65. Id. at 456. The taxpayers resided in California, a community property state. Id.
66. Id. The taxpayer claimed that the larger portion of the family income for 1949 was
community income reportable one-half by each spouse, rather than separate income reportable solely by him. Id.
67. Id. at 457. The taxpayer and wife are "related taxpayer[s]" under I.R.C. § 1313(c)
(1982) and thus, the taxpayer was entitled to file suit on behalf of his spouse.
68. 355 F.2d at 457-60. The court stated:
[V]e believe that Congress intended us to view an "item" of gross income as anything
"specific and indentifiable" by which such income is "directly affected." . . The District Court's determination clearly "directly affected" plaintiff's . . . total gross income
for [1949]; it reduced plaintiff's total income with the conomitant increase in the

[spouse's] total income for that year.
Id. at 460.
69. See, e.g., Gill v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1962); United States v. Dubuque
Packing Co., 233 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1956); Moultrie Cotton Mills v. United States, 151 F. Supp.
482 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
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lems caused by the passage of time which might have favored a stricter reading
of item. In fact, a stricter interpretation merely would have created a windfall
to the taxpayer in derogation of the policies that surround the mitigation provisions.70
The Tax Court, in Cotter v. Commissioner,71 similarly rejected the
"specificity of item" approach propounded by the taxpayer in Karpe when it
applied section 1312(3)(A) to prevent an avoidance of tax. In Cotter, the taxpayer erroneously treated an exchange of land for corporate stock as a capital
gains transaction. The taxpayer had an adjusted basis of $21,023 in the land
and received 250 shares of corporate stock valued at $50,000. A long-term
capital gain of $28,962 for the year 1955 was reported and the taxpayer gave
each share of stock a cost basis of $200.72
In 1956 the corporation redeemed 235 of the taxpayer's 250 shares for
$52,704 and the taxpayer reported a long-term capital gain of $5,704. The
Commissioner subsequently determined a deficiency for 1955, claiming that
the taxpayer's gain of $28,962 realized on the exchange of land for stock was
ordinary income rather than long-term capital gain. Conversely, the taxpayer
contended that the 1955 exchange fell within the nonrecognition provision of
section 351(a) and thus no gain should be recognized.7 3 In 1961 the Tax Court
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. United States, 265 F.2d
293 (7th Cir. 1959), rejected the specificity of item requirement when applying § 1312(4), see
supra note 58. In Olin the taxpayer claimed an ordinary income loss of $168,126 for 1944.
The Commissioner disallowed the loss. After protracted litigation, the taxpayer was allowed
to take the loss but only as a long-term capital loss. Because the taxpayer had no capital
gains in 1944 against which to offset this long-term capital loss, it attempted to carryover
the loss to 1945 and filed a refund for that year based on this capital-loss carryover. Refunds
for 1945 were barred by the statute of limitations, however, and the taxpayer had to rely
on the mitigation provisions. 265 F.2d at 293.
The issue before the court was whether § 1312(4) applied to permit a reopening of 1945.
The Commissioner argued that there had been no double disallowance of a loss deduction
because the long-term capital loss had, in fact, been allowed for 1944. The court, citing
Gooch, rejected this argument, however, and held that § 1312(4) applied because there had
been a disallowance of the taxpayer's ordinary income loss for 1944 and of his capitalcarryover for 1945. Id. at 296-97. The court acknowledged that these deductions were not the
same or of the same type, but stated: "[T]here is no requirement in § 1312(4) that they be
the same type. Both the contended for, but disallowed, ordinary loss and the disallowed
carryover claim of loss are based on the identical transaction and in this sense they are the
same deduction." Id. at 296. See also Skinner v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 384 (M.D. Fla.
1963). In Skinner, the court held there was a double inclusion of an item of gross income
within § 1312(1) when an amount of income related to the same transaction and property
was included as ordinary income in one year and as long-term capital gain in another year.
70. See, e.g., Estate of Sara Louise Gill, 35 T.C. 1208 (1961), afJ'd, 306 F.2d 902 (5th Cir.
1962) (following the Gooclh interpretation of "item" to rectify double inclusion of an item
of gross income); Estate of A.W. SaRelle, 31 T.C. 272 (1961) (following broad interpretation
of Gooch to prevent shifting of income).
71. 40 T.C. 506 (1963).
72. Id. at 507.
73. Id. I.R.C. § 351(a) (1982) states in relevant part: "No gain or loss shall be recognized
if property is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for
stock or securities in such corporation and immediately after the exchange such person or
persons are in control.. . of the corporation."
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agreed with the taxpayer and granted a refund for the taxes paid on the'
capital gains resulting from the 1955 exchange.7 4 Because the application of
section 851 triggers section 358 to reduce the basis in the taxpayer's shares of
stock,75 the Commissioner assessed a deficiency against the taxpayer for the
1956 redemption.78 Although the statute of limitations barred further assessments for 1956, the Commissioner relied on the mitigation statute to prevent
77
a double exclusion of gross income.
The taxpayer contended that an adjustment pursuant to section 1312(3)(A)
is proper only if the amount excluded from gross income in 1955 was the same
item excluded in 1956. Clearly, the gain to the taxpayer on the exchange of
land for stock was an item excluded from his gross income in 1955 due to the
nonrecognition provisions of section 351(a). The taxpayer argued that this
same item was not a gain excluded in 1956 because he had no gain from an
exchange of land in 1956. The item excluded in 1956, the taxpayer urged, was
the gain realized on the redemption of his stock, a different item from the
gain excluded in 1955.
The Commissioner countered that the nonrecognition philosophy underlying section 351 dictates the stock should be considered a mere substitute for
the land. Thus, the exclusion of the increased gain on the 1956 redemption
caused by the stock's reduced basis should be deemed the same item that was
excluded in the 1955 exchange. The Tax Court agreed with the Commis-

74. 40 T.C. at 507-08.
75. I.R.C. § 358 (1982) states in pertinent part:
In the case of an exchange to which section 351 ... applies (1) Nonrecognition property
The basis of the property permitted to be received under such section without the
recognition of gain or loss shall be the same as that of the property exchanged (A)decreased by (i) the fair market value of any other property (except money) received by the
taxpayer.
(ii) the amount of any money received by the taxpayer, and
(iii) the amount of loss to the taxpayer which was recognized on such exchange,
and

(B)increased by (i) the amount which was treated as a dividend, and
(ii) the amount of gain to the taxpayer which was recognized on such exchange
(not including any portion of such gain which was treated as a dividend).
76. 40 T.C. at 508. In applying § 358, see supra note 75, the taxpayer's basis in his stock
will be equal to the basis of the transferred property ($21,023) rather than the fair market
value of the transferred stock ($50,000).
77. 40 T.C. at 508. As the basis of the stock is reduced pursuant to § 358, the long-term
gain realized upon redemption is increased pursuant to § 1001. It appears that § 1312(7) (basis
of property after erroneous treatment of prior transaction) might also be applicable. However,
the first requirement for the applicability of § 1312(7) is that the determination must have
determined the basis of property. See I.R.C. § 1312(7) (1982). The Tax Court has construed
this requirement literally and has held that it is not satisfied merely because, as in Cotter, the
determination determines facts upon which the basis directly depends. See, e.g., Brennen v.
Commissioner, 20 T.C. 495 (1953); American Found. Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 502 (1943).
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sioner's interpretation and applied the mitigation provisions to prevent tax
78
avoidance.
The Cotter holding furthers the policies underlying both section 351 and
section 1312(3)(A). Judicial adoption of the taxpayer's position not only
would have postponed gain on the 1955 section 351 exchange, but would have
avoided it entirely. Because the amount of adjustment for 1956 was readily
ascertainable, the liberal construction given the term item was justified.
Evidently, the judicial interpretation of item within section 1312(3) accords with the broad approach espoused in Gooch in order to prevent tax
avoidance. Unfortunately, because the mitigation provisions are complex and
courts interpreting the sections often do not adequately articulate their rationale, the section is often misconstrued and unduly liberalized. For example in
Perkins v. Commissioner7 the taxpayer received a $39,367 loan in 1949 from
his controlled corporation. The taxpayer gave the corporation a promissory
note in that amount and reported no taxable income on the transaction. 0 In
1951 the corporation distributed all its assets to the taxpayer, including the
promissory note, in a complete liquidation. Although the $39,367 was included in the amount realized by the taxpayer on the liquidating distribution,
the taxpayer reported no gain on receipt of the note.8 ' To prevent the $39,367
from escaping taxation entirely, the Commissioner asserted a deficiency for
1949 on the ground that the $39,367 paid to the taxpayer in 1951 was actually
a taxable dividend. The Tax Court, however, rejected the Commissioner's
claim and ruled that the 1949 transaction was properly treated as a bona fide
8 2
loan and thus was not taxable.
The Commissioner then sought to reopen 1951 under the mitigation provisions to correct the taxpayer's failure to report any gain upon receipt of the
note in that year. 3 The Tax Court held that section 1312(3)(B) applied because there had been a double exclusion from gross income in 1949 and 1951
of the $39,367.4 Although the $39,367 distributed to the taxpayer pursuant to
the liquidation was erroneously excluded from the taxpayer's gross income in
1951, it is more problematic to characterize the exclusion of that amount in
1949 as erroneous. The court stated that because the taxpayer did not include
the $39,367 withdrawal as a taxable dividend in his 1949 gross income, he
excluded from income "an item not included in a return filed by the taxpayer
78.

40 T.C. at 510-11. The Tax Court held:

[T]he exclusion of the gain in the year of the exchange results in excluding an item of
income which is the same as the item omitted from gross income through use in a
subsequent year of a basis for the property received as if gain had not been recognized
in the year of the exchange.
Id. at 511.
79. 36 T.C. 313 (1961).
80. Id. at 314.
81. The tax payer's bookkeeper erroneously included the face value of the note in his
basis in the stock of the corporation. Id.
82. Id. at 318-20.
83. ld. at 320-21.
84. Id. at 321-23.
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and in respect of which the tax was not paid, but which is includible in the
gross income of the taxpayer for another taxable year (here, in the gross income for 1951)." 115
The Tax Court's conclusion in Perkins represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the term item as it is used in section 1312.8 The court unduly liberalized the statute by equating item with amount. This interpretation, however, fails to recognize the necessity of construing the term as part of
the phrase "item of gross income." A nontaxable, bona fide loan is not an
item of gross income to be included in or excluded from a taxpayer's gross in87
come.
SUMMARY

The multiplicity of purposes behind the mitigation statute as well as the
general language of sections 1312(1) and 1312(3) have contributed to the
courts' inability to articulate a clear, simple test for determining whether there
has been a double inclusion or double exclusion of an item of gross income.
Nevertheless, beginning with the landmark decision of Gooch, courts have
fashioned a number of principles which provide a workable methodology for
determining the proper application and interpretation of sections 1312(1) and
1312(3).
The term "item," as it appears in sections 1312(l) and (3), has a meaning
that is unique to its role in the mitigation statute. The term should not be
construed restrictively to refer to specific, identifiable types of gross income,
such as those listed in section 61, or those particular items reported on a taxpayer's return. Instead, item "should be interpreted broadly to include any
item or amount which affects gross income."88
The purpose of the mitigation provision is to prevent double taxation,
double deductions, or inequitable tax avoidance which result from the taxpayer or the Commissioner taking inconsistent positions on tax matters and
attempting to benefit from the intervention of the statute of limitaions. Congress, however, also intended that the mitigation statute should not impair
the essential function of the statute of limitations. Thus, when stale claims are
involved and the proof of essential facts is hindered by the inordinate passage
of time, a stricter interpretation of sections 1312(1) and (3) is appropriate.
Sections 1312(1) and (3) are concerned solely with "items of gross income,"
not with items of taxable income. The courts thus must carefully differentiate
between itemized deductions and matters reflected in the basis or cost of goods
85. Id. at 323.
86._See Knickerbocker, supranote 9, at 252-53.
87. An analysis of §§ 1312(2) and 1312(4) provides further insight into the phrase "item
of gross income." See, e.g., B.C. Cook & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 422 (1975), afJ'd,
584 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1978); Max Schulman, 21 T.C. 403 (1953); Brennan v. Commissioner, 20
T.C. 495 (1953). See also Transport Co. of Tex. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 569 (1974), af'd,
536 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1976), where the taxpayer argued against the availability of § 1312(2)
by characterizing his understatement of income as being attributable to an increase in basis
which offset gain realized on the sale of assets, rather than being attributable to a deduction.
88. 78 F. Supp. at 100. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
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sold. The former deductions are irrelevant for purposes of sections 1312(1) and
(3) while the latter can trigger the application of those sections. The consequences of excepting an occasional valid mitigation claim from the coverage of
section 1312 because of this differentiation is preferable to unduly liberalizing
the statute to satisfy judicial notions of equity.
When construing section 1312, courts must recognize the policies which
envelope the statute. If such policies are to be effectuated, it is necessary to
balance the objectives of preventing double taxation, double deductions and
inequitable tax avoidance with the essential nature of the statute of limitation.
Ultimately, however, courts must transform these competing legislative policies
into a clear, workable framework which will enable a consistent application of
the mitigation statute.
ROBERT L. MILLER
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